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The Private Equity Consensus Trade

Is there a reckoning coming for those who promoted private equity?

By: Dan Rasmussen

There’s an old saying in corporate America: Nobody ever got fired for buying IBM.

Over the last 20 years, private equity has become the IBM of institutional investing.

Endowments bought it. Foundations bought it. Pension funds bought it. Family offices bought it. Wealth managers bought it. Consultants recommended it. Investment committees demanded it. If you wanted to signal sophistication, you bought more private equity.

And not just a little more. Many elite institutions have come to hold more private equity than public equities. Harvard’s fiscal 2025 portfolio was 41% private equity and only 14% public equities. Some of the world’s most sophisticated institutions now allocate 30%, 40%, even 50% of their portfolios to private markets. BNY Wealth found that families with $250 million or more allocated 28% to private equity, more than the 21% allocated to public stocks.

This bet was not sized appropriately relative to market capitalization. Private equity globally has less than $6 trillion of AUM, while global public equity market cap is about $130 trillion, meaning private equity as an asset class is less than 5% the size of the public equity market. If your wealth manager put 40% of your portfolio into India because he told you Indian equities (which have roughly the same market capitalization as private equity and better liquidity) would reliably outperform other equity markets, you’d probably ask some follow-up questions. India may or may not be a good investment, and you might or might not want to be overweight it, but even if you love India, putting 40% into that one trade would force you to forgo the benefits of diversification into other markets and crowd out a variety of other opportunities.

But for years, surprisingly few people questioned these PE allocations. That’s because there is a near complete consensus—still!—that private equity is the best asset class. Adams Street’s 2025 global LP survey found that 85% of limited partners expected private markets to outperform public markets over the long run. An investment consulting firm captured the spirit of the age in its paper “Life Can Be Better After 40(%),” writing that families with multigenerational wealth “may be particularly well positioned to consider allocating 40% or more of their assets to private investments.”

The sales pitch for private equity is great. Private equity funds are better asset owners. They make money by improving operations. They align incentives. They are long-term owners not distracted by day-to-day volatility. And, of course, the industry had generated excellent returns in the 1980s, 1990s, and even the early 2000s. Those who invested early did very well.

It’s often said there are no bad ideas in finance, only good ideas taken too far. One of the most reliable principles in finance is that excess returns attract capital and capital compresses excess returns. Nobody believes a hedge fund strategy can absorb unlimited assets without degradation. Nobody believes a factor premium becomes larger after every investor discovers it. The overallocation and excessive enthusiasm alone should have been a warning signal that smart investors were taking the PE idea too far.

Yet private equity was often discussed as though the normal laws of competition did not apply. Private equity firms proliferated. Purchase multiples went ever higher (or, more accurately, EBITDA multiples rose slightly while EBITDA adjustments soared). Yet return expectations from consultants went only one direction: up!

Now the tide has begun to turn. Private equity returns have been worse than public markets for years. Private equity and private credit are on the front pages of the newspaper seemingly daily for their rising inventory of stranded software assets. At this juncture, perhaps it’s time we asked an uncomfortable question: How should investors evaluate the people who most aggressively promoted private equity?

Suppose your university endowment dramatically overweighted private equity. Suppose your consultant recommended a 40% private equity allocation. Suppose your multi-family office CIO encouraged you to emulate Yale, Harvard, or Princeton. How should you evaluate their judgment?

Investors should ask a simple question: What would convince you to reduce your allocation to private equity? If the answer is, “Nothing,”—if years of underperformance, record purchase multiples, shrinking distributions, and crowded positioning do not matter—then what is being defended is no longer an investment thesis. It is an article of faith.

Graham Infinger